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The most common reaction to the events of la July 1971 was one of surprise. Even If the Morrocan monarchy did not appear to be any more protected from an attack than the other Arab monarchies, the attack, when it came, was from an unexpected area. It was known that Mohamed V, then Hassan II had done their utmost to keep the armed forces under their direct control and to avoid giving them any ground for complaint. It is also supposed that they kept careful watch over the allegiance of their officials. Surprise actions may of course have arisen from this area: these would have been expected from the lower ranks and not from the senior officers. The revolutions In Egypt, Iraq and in Libya were brought about by the captains and not the generals. These same captains, coming from and remaining close to the people thanks to their modest salaries, were inspired by an Islamic ideology. What possible ideology could have roused those generals and colonels of 10 July, pampered by the regime?
These sated men bore daily witness to a luxuary infinitely surpassing that which they were granted. Did these men, decorated but under the thumb of one who exercised absolute authority, rear up in retaliation? Did they want more than wealth and honours in imitation of a great many officers from the Arab countries? The answer to these questions lies perhaps in the file on the Interrogations which preceded the executions. The answer will be brought to light before long.
If the secret concerning the leaders of the conspiracy is to remain so for the time being, could not the motivatIons of those involved and their helpers be re-enacted? By "helpers" we take here to mean those who indirectly took part by the very fact that they remained silent. For a great deal of silence or tacit complicity would be required for this armed column to reach Ahermoumou In Skhirat, crossing Fès, Meknès and Rabat, without the king, at any time, being warned of this. The attitude of those Involved was explained by King Hassan II in two contradictory ways: They were said to be drugged; their commanding officers were also said to have persuaded them into believing that a plot was afoot to overthrow the king and that it was their duty to protect or rescue him.
We do not believe In drugs. These doubtlessly enable a person to ignore danger and not to act contrary to his deep feelings. The witnesses who testified concerning this were of course trustworthy, but based their case solely on the abnormal elation which made them appear as marauders in their behaviour. This Is to forget that an outburst of extreme violence, hate, rebellion or paIn can create the same effects as drugs. Those who saw the hysterical crowd at Nasser's funeral could also have believed in the power of drugs.
On the other hand, difficult though it may be not Imagine, these young people were taken for conspirators reunited with hostile Intentions against the king and the group of high-ranking civil servants, ambassadors and foreigners who with champagne-filled glasses or plates of smoked salmon in hand, filled the palace of SkhIrat. Even supposing that some of them had been fooled, the others, i.e. those who had then gone to proclaim the republic on Radio Morocco, had certainly not been fooled. It is the state of mind of this group of people which it would appear interesting to understand.
When such a coup hits a regime it is only normal to look for its cause In the opposition group. Here, nobody would have expected a military coup and Hassan II himself, while establishing a tenuous link between the criticisms levelled against the opposition and the attempted military coup, has publicly declared that the opposition (and even the friends of those accused in Marrakesh) were responsible neither for its conception nor for Its planning.
It is known that the Istiqlal party remained monarchist. The standpoint of the UNFP is somewhat more complex: If It Is officially monarchist (how could It publicly profess to be otherwise?). It is convinced that the monarchy constitutes the safest defence of the "Islamic Feudal System" which one wishes to quash and the main obstacle to the coming of the "socialist" regime where "the sole solution" to the economic and social problems facing the country is seen. The other "legal" political parties are only the King's marionettes and play the role of opposition.
This badly organized and weak opposition represents but a small part of the real opposition In Morocco. All those who have some contact with young people at school, students and secondary school pupils, know just what are the feelings of this age group regarding not only the system but also to the person of the king himself. It cannot be ignored that the investigators of the Skhirat incident were young people, and, if not intellectuals, could at least have been men of a certain academic ability. (The level of the school at Ahermoumou is obviously far from that of the level required at the University.)
What then thinks the youth of Morocco? It would take too long to describe this in its entirety. However, even there, unanimity is not the order of the day. Some see the solution in an Islamic order while others aspire to an "Arabic Socialism". However, all have misgivings about their future and are deeply vexed by the contrast existing between the affluence of a few and the poverty of the greater number.
One suspects that the cadets of Ahermoumou, who carried out the Skhlrat coup (and the rebels of the coup of 16 August 1972) were moved by an exact Ideology. Their radio reporters have as yet not presented their programme. Even if they had uttered the word socialism, this would not have meant very much. Was not the first governing party in the first Moroccan parliament called the "Socialist Democratic Party"? But one does not, without being moved by powerful emotions, give oneself up to acts of violence such as were demonstrated at Skhirat.
Among the details reported by the eye-witnesses concerning the scenes of 10 July, one in particular struck us. The soldiers who were searching the king's guests did not take money, however snatched luxury goods such as jewellery and golden lighters, threw them onto the ground and stamped on them as If possessed by a certain frenzy.
This small detail may be linked to a larger one, so large that it is spoken of from Algiers to Tunis, to Paris and as far away as Washington and one is unable to go to Morocco without hearing it spoken of many times a day by Moroccans and by foreigners alike. The "It" refers to corruption (cf. speech by the King on 4 August 1971). "The Bakchich Empire" is universal and the underdevelopment gives it more favourable ground than elsewhere. In a poor country, power has often been the single and most sure source of wealth. But Morocco seems to have broken some sort of record here, If not on a world scale - at least by Maghrebi and perhaps even Arab standards. (In the vastness of Asia everything Is on a much larger scale.) In the first half of 1971 scandals proliferated. Just as the monarch was about to leave the country on an official visit things were to go further before the U S Government expressed the wish for the trip to be postponed due to corruption Involving so many high-ranking Moroccan individuals that the affair had to be covered up. And was not It General Madbouh who brought back from Washington this unhappy piece of news, with, It Is reported, "proof of guilt" in hand.
The same Madbouh was a privileged among privileged according to Hassan II himself. But who had done such a thing to him and his accomplices of the 10 July 1971 and all the other privileged? Nobody thought that in Morocco these atrocities could be committed unbeknown to the King and against his will. One gained moreover the impression that despite a few rare and spectacular sanctions against the "atrocities wIthin the atrocity" that it was a question of a system of government aimed at alIgning Itself to the ruling class and levelling by its seductions, people of worth especially young people whom the opposition risked inveigling.
Such an outstanding Morrocan student, Trotskylst or Maoist though he may have been, when attending the University of Paris or Stockholm, was found to be an able top civil servant, complete with villa in Souissl (the select residential of Rabat), and complete with a bank account In Zürich. Yes, it's true. And how were the large union powers and leaders of the working masses able to bring about the revolution while driving about in palace-given cars? Yes, that's also true.
However, disadvantages as well as advantages were part and parcel of the system. Those men who had a wealth of experience about Morocco and In front of whom, before the 10 July, we confessed our doubts concerning the effectiveness of this policy and the future of the regime to which we had entrusted ourselves, repelled to us that this had lasted for centuries and that the average Moroccan continued to link in his mind strength and wealth and that those who themselves had become incensed at the corrüption were at the same time ready to give in to this temptation should It ever come their way.
Two historical errors, it seemed to us, weakened this argument. First of all this argument failed to take note of the most ancient Islamic traditions, viz. the contempt for possessions which exemplify the riches of this world. Down through the ages, reformers rose up to denounce the rich and powerful (the two being synonymous) and from time to time involved the indigent masses In a sort of revolutionary crusade. The history of the Moslem World is not without its Savonarolas. Their role, if equally marked, at the time when the works concerning religious purification were about to make their re-appearance and whose authors did not delay in yielding to the same temptations which had been the undoing of their predecessors. Even in Morocco these reformers came from the South, for the most part a country of drought and poverty:
Almoravides, Almohades and even in the twentieth century EI-Hiba etc. Today these southern men, Berbers or Arabs (of what significance is race here?), make camp at the gates of the towns: they populate almost a third of the shanty towns of the larger communities.
The second error fails to take note of the serious changes which have affected modern Morocco. This year there are a million and a half children in our schools almost all of whom learn French. For these ancient civilisations there exist no "Great Wall of China" for their protection. The old man, of course, has not entirely disappeared and Skhirat, while assuming a Maghrebl air, no longer remains what it once was. The poverty stricken peasant-become-sultan of traditional folklore was the only conceivable representation of poverty overcome. Today it is known, even in the shanty towns, that other methods of overcoming poverty exist, examples of which have been provided by entire nations. In former times, of the rich man it was said: "God for him has provided". Nowadays this is no longer the case of all the rich. Indeed, some quite simply see themselves as equated with thieves. Young impoverished school leavers who can neither hope for a post in the administration (because 7096 of the employees are under 40 years of age) nor can they hope for work in the private sector because a hundred to a hundred and ten posts were created during the years of plenty, when, actually, double this would have been required simply to come to terms with the demographic explosion. How could they nurture a sentiment other than hate for the recipients of such wanton and doubtfully acquired luxury?
March 1965 saw the inhabitants of Casablanca's shanty towns take action. Such was the repression of their actions, according to a witness "that they will never take action so hastily again". Unemployment amongst academics together with rebellion by graduates produced a danger more Insidious and an explosive potential of an even greater magnitude. Was there nothing they could do against armoured vehicles? And herein lies the reasons why the revolutions of the Third World did not have their origin in the suburbs as did those in the Europe of the XIX century but rather had their inception in military camps.
One further element seems worthy of mention In the illogical train of events of that mad day when acts of violence were aimed against foreigners which is a singular occurrence in Morocco, nationals of which display a keenly developed sense of hospitality although It has otherwise been stated. When these acts of violence were perpetrated for example in 1907, 1912 and from 1953-55, they took the form of struggles, all be they threatened or opposed, In a bid for Independence. Think of the visitors to Skhlrat; ambassadors, doctors, businessmen etc. who had been treated in a like fashion, nay verily, slain by a hail of machine-gun fire. This would not have been made known and certainly not justified but would be explained in a manner devoid of any feeling however brief or powerful.
For a full understanding, some method of recapitulation is required. Political Independence does not automatically guarantee economic independence, especially when modern industry, which is the key to development, remains In the hands of the onetime colonialist who brought or Instigated the aforementioned Industry. Socialistic countries have solved the problem by nationalization. in Morocco, a country which has chosen the Liberal option (in the economic sense of the term), it was necessary in order to guarantee this independence that the national upper classes replaced the foreign capitalists. It is a known fact that the upper classes did not wish to or could not carry this out. Unlike their European predecessors of the XVIII century these rare and mighty merchants did not change Into "capitalist entrepreneurs". With regard to long-term investment In Industry, they preferred to invest in the short term and to speculate on the markets or certain "stakes" such as land, property, gold, jewellery and leaving foreign investors the benefits but also the risks of industrial expansion. So flagrant was the slackness that this "Liberal" but "nationalistic" state had to intervene itself, to an ever increasing extent in the industrial investments which without the state's intervention, would almost if not entirely have been consumed by foreign capitalists. At the Inception of the NBID (the National Bank for Industrial Development), whose name clearly defines Its aims, with capital furnished partly by the state, partly by foreign groups, it was understood that 10% of all shares would be placed at the disposal of the national capitalists. The latter's policy of non-involvment was so effective that the foreign groups also had to underwrite their 1096.
The programme to Moroccanize the tertiary sector announced last year adequately satisfied the wishes of the Moroccan upper classes, comfortably installed in the shade of a secondary sector whose responsibility and risks are shared between the state and foreigners alike. The programme developed swiftly in a Guizot-like whirlwind (money is gained and quicker at that by publicity than by the making of pig iron) however the absence of those smiths who forged the industry of the France of Louis Philippe was noticeable.
The top civil servants (many of whom were themselves products of the upper classes or who were related to them through marriage) were caught in the grip of this same whirlwind. Those remaining were the ones who chose to study and consequently found their degree to be the "Open Sesame" to a veritable Aladdin's cave. The would-be Louis Philippe type upper classes hoarded their money avariciously and painstakinqly avoided any outward sign of wealth. This Bedoum tendency to vaunt, between the two extremes of starvation and wanton profligacy, Is making its comeback among the nouveau riche Morrocans: in certain milieu of the capital It is considered indelicate, nay shameful, to entertain when one does not aspire to the modest possession of a swimming-pool in the garden of their villa.
Those residing hard by the gates of splendour were subjected to an ostentatious display on the part of the redolently-opulent guests. Such people tended to confuse their envious desires with their profound contempt for those, nationals and expatriates alike, who partook of this grandeur cum splendour so far removed from the poverty of the greater number and the mediocrity of the aspiring middle classes. Given a little more instruction and information, local profiteers of the tertiary sector will come to be treated as servants of the foreign lords of the second sector. This provides Moroccan progressive magazines with a seemingly constant supply of material. The intellectuals who edit the aforementioned magazines are familiar with Marx and they denounce the upper classes, stalwarts of the regime, as compliant stooges of "Western capitalism".
The cadets of Ahermoümou have read neither Marx~ nor would they subscribe to such progressive magazines. However, they are well aware of the fact that the profits from the more eminent among the upper classes and of the dishonest civil servants are carefully deposited in the banks of capitalist countries. The ideological phase has, as yet, not been attained but remains at one of moral Indignation and nationalistic reaction. These two factors were all that was necessary to place the regime on the verge of ruin thus highlighting what we believed to be one of its maIn weaknesses.
A Frenchman living at the same time in Morocco informed us that while at the house of some Moroccan friends, hourly reports concerning the events at Skhlrat were broadcast on the radio. Joy preceded sadness and everyone took it In turns to pledge their loyalty.
A regime is labelled archaic when It does not accomodate the soclo-psychological features of the people for whom It is responsible. It is not the monarchy such as it is which is In question: archaic republics actually do exist. However, a XX century country however resilient its former strength cannot be governed as in days of yore. A Moroccan stated concerning Hassan II: "He claims to be a modern king while he at the same time rules the country in the same way as Moulay Ismail (former sultan in 1672-1727). ThIs is not possible." The "government" in Morocco of today does not consist of "ministers" in the modern sense of the word but of slaves for the king "by Divine Right" whose will and order must be obeyed and cannot be called in question.
The Divine Right of Kings has never been without its risk and disadvantages. In the complexity of the modern world, one doubts the practicality of such Divine Right. The man who reigns alone is condemned to a position of greater isolation to the point of becoming the prisoner rendered helpless by his Isolation. He longer listens to a single person and the truth can no longer be told to him." This plaint from faithful advisers has existed since time immemorial. Only a short time ago did it resound in the corridors of Morrocan palaces.
There exist "charismatic" leaders who equate the isolation of absolute power to a sort of mystical communion with their people. In the absence of highly individual gifts of native ability the ancient kings of France were given the holy unction, the Alaouite sultans were given the traditional Moroccan blessing "La Baraka". Would this have been enough In the Morocco of 1971 to guarantee a means of communication between the monarch and his people?
During the course of the days of 10 July 1971 and of 16 August 1972, onlookers were struck by near absolute passiveness of the Moroccan people. No signs of any help could be found either to support the King or to help the band of marauders. All that took place seemed to happen in a sort of ethereal vacuum far above the heads of ordinary mortals who had neither wish nor ability to give in to it. So swift was the train of events that it hardly left any time, let it be said, for the ordinary mortals to react. However, the relief brought about by the certain knowledge of the king's safety and the aborted coup ought to have ignited an explosion of elation in the "faithful people". The absence of any spontaneous reaction demonstrates once more, should there be a need for such, the cruel solitude of power absolute and corrupt.
A further, not to be ignored, aspect of the putsch exists even if its understanding might occasion some small difficulty.
This is Its aspect of berber "siba". It is an open secret that the royal armed forces contained many Berbers. Berber not only in the majority of the "second class" but also in the upper echelons of the army; the greater part of those generals shot down on 13 July 1971 were originally from the Berber people. Of course this explains itself through quite natural reasons. The lust after arms and military career remained most virulent amongst the rough mountain tribes, who are for the greater part speakers of the Berber dialect. To represent the putsch as an insurrection against the Arabs by the Berber people would be ludicrously inexact. What one is simply aiming at establishing Is that Hassan II, sensing the escalation of danger, had, it seems, reacted in a like manner to that of the threatened protectorate placed his confidence in the Berbers who were considered as the most steadfast because they were the most traditionalist and less contaminated by the poisons of modernicstic theory and modern society. Without a shadow of a doubt the "Myth of the Good Berber" has a hard life and always contains the same disappointments for those who place their trust in it.
Rarely has it been known for the Berbers to present a united front: violent clashes have always been the characteristic of clans and tribes. The King's aides-de-camp, massacred at Skhirat, were they themselves Berber. Madbouh and the ringleaders of the rebellion were not only Berber but also Riffians. It is known that the Riff tribe was roused in 1958 by the FAR (Forces Armées Royales, moroccan Royal Forces), whose prince, Moulay Hassan (Hassan II), was also the chief of staff. The repression led by the FAR caused the Riffs to suffer a period of hardship. What possible role could this memory have played, deeply entrenched but nevertheless alive, in the decisions made by the chief marauders? To determine this is all but impossible. On the other hand, what can be established with certainty is that these proud mountain tribes whose generals, decorated with military honours,were the pride and hope of their tribes who will not readily forget the image of their bodies riddled with bullets and spat upon by the riff-raff. Vendetta is a well known Berber speciality. It is however served cold.
The Riffians in "siba" (dissidence) of 1958 announced with competitive relish: "We have had enough of Fassis' goverment. The numerous inhabitants of Fès, if the truth be told, those in the corridors of power, played a simply symbolic involvment in this affair: a symbol of the town with its accumulation of wealth and luxury items, which at one and the same time raises up the desire to plunder, to hate poverty and all puritanical reprobation. Once again we come across the factors which have already been brought to light in the mysterious Skhirat affair and which allow us without any shadow of doubt to put into its correct place the detail of "sib. Berber". These Berbers are perhaps but the tip of the iceberg of this Moroccan peasant army, an army which has been raised up through the centuries against luxury and oppression in the cities and which knows furthermore that poverty is not a fatalistic decree from Allah. The instinct of these simple people is here confirmed by economic analyses: the statistics show that the increase in living standards amongst city dwellers, or let us say to be more precise, certain city dwellers, has risen at the expense of those living in rural areas.
It is often useful in understanding the origins of a political movement to consider what consequently became of it. In the case of a failure, as in this case we do not have this resource, Howover, it is not forbidden to ask oneself what the putsch would have achieved had It succeeded. This is reminiscent of the regime of the colonels In Greece. We ought to have however, for our part, given some thought to the Islamic Nasserian system. Had the bullet which killed Madboüh sped a few centimetres farther on, the Morocco of today might have been governed by a group of Islamic Nasserian officers.
Regarding the revolution at the Palace, the putsch of 10 July 1971 failed by all accounts. The reality concerning the matter, we believe, is quite different. What come to light from the stammerings of some scruffy soldiers equipped with arms and ideas were these large problems which seize Third world countries by the throat and which Morocco delayed too long in facing.
It Is true that for centuries the people of Morocco have often lived both in poverty and misery, however Death periodically swept away the excesses of her people. Today this excess is some what around 3.296 per year, which means that the population is doubling every twenty years. And these men who are no longer dying and who are no longer eating, go to school and listen to the radio: there are transistors in every tent and in the "nouala" (poor people's habitation). The era of submissiveness is at an end.
The system which collapsed politically on 10 July 1971 and on 16 August 1972 was that of the old Makhzen order, and had lasted anachronistically even as far as the middle of the XX century, during 45 years of the protectorate and 30 years of independence, consisted of directl~g the country's wealth to those In power and the "vultures" who remained close on their heals.
The economic theory which concerns development is at the same time both very Intricate and very simple. In order to produce more one must invest; to invest one must save; to save on must consume less than one produces, that is to say; to deprive oneself. Throughout the centuries the only ones to deprive themselves, and at the same time tacitly accept this, have been the poor for the most part. Today, however, they will not accept this: they accept this even less when they see a minority of privileged plunge themselves into decadence which does not even have the merit of being gainfully earned. The equability concerning this deprivation is perhaps no more than a fantastic dream. It Is necessary, nevertheless, for this inequality to be less objectionable and for the poorer for they themselves to benefit from their sacrifices which are the more hard to make.
The answer is simple but demands no less than a revolution. When revolutions are not carried out in a peaceful manner (such have existed), they are carried out amidst a surrounding of blood and destruction, where the great suffer less than the small. But the Moroccan people have no choice. For Morocco it is a question of life or death. Either the Moroccans go ahead by overthrowing the corrupted monarchy or they will succumb as an independent and free Islamic nation. In the Koran It is said that "where kings govern there corruption comes into existence and turn free people into slaveIu. Islam is originally a revolutionary ideology and movement against tyranny and hereditary monarchy.
The gateway to the future is still open. The rumblings of 10 July 1971 and of 16 August 1972 are a sure Indication that the ball has been set in motion. Hassan II and his menials will not be able to stop the course of time. The destiny that the Shah of Iran was struck by would have served as a lesson to Hassan II and to all Moroccans and foreign powers who profit by his regime.
Ahmed Rami
Box 316, 101 26 Stockholm. Sweden. Tel:+46.70-812 1240
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